Coups for rent
Coups for rent
Updated 11:27pm (Mla time) Oct 04, 2004
By Juan Mercado
Inquirer News Service
Editor's Note: Published on page A12 of the October 5, 2004 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer
WILL President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo decisively close down one of this troubled country's newer businesses: "coups for rent"?
Courts are now hearing mutiny cases lodged against 32--out of the original 325 soldiers--who took over the Oakwood apartments, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales noted. The "Magdalo" rebels, thus, are beyond the President's reach, he said. And amnesty is Congress' prerogative.
Mixed signals earlier wafted from Malacanang on a "deal," following the public apology from Navy Lt. Antonio Trillanes VI and other mutineers.
In their mea culpa, the rebels--mostly Philippine Military Academy Class '95 graduates--insisted they were sincere reformers. Democracy then does not grow out of a gun barrel? They'd abide now by the Constitution, in the military, if given a chance.
"Hot money" sloshes in this town. No one, let alone deposed Joseph Estrada, picked up the mutiny tab, the Magdalos claimed. Their "idealism was not for hire."
Reactions were varied. Veteran of failed "God Save The Queen" coups, Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile, predictably thumbed-up amnesty. Finger your godfather first, a House defense committee member said. Someone bankrolled those polished boots, radios, airline tickets, plus brand-new vans later abandoned. "Who rented this coup?"
"Unless justice is done, this problem will reappear in the future," warned Dr. Carolina Hernandez, University of the Philippines scholar on the military. We've been there before, she recalled. Both the Davide and Feliciano Commissions insist on justice as basis for closure.
Amnesty chatter sent some to re-read "Closer Than Brothers-Manhood at the Philippine Military Academy" (Yale University 1999). This study compares three generations of PMA graduates: Classes '40, '71 and '90. Written by Prof. Alfred McCoy, it asks: Have constitutional values, in soldiers trained on taxpayers money, atrophied?
"In the Philippines, institutions often seem the sum of personal ties," McCoy notes. PMA graduates "translate broad ideological currents into institutional change in an impoverished country where 169 families monopolize power."
Battle and Japanese concentration camps bonded Class '40 graduates. "Their belief in civil supremacy would later withstand the pressures of higher command," the study adds. "They actively blocked coup attempts."
Martial law co-opted Class '71. It became the "mailed fist of the dictatorship." Among its 85 graduates, five tortured, six were murdered. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan and 14 others were neck-deep in coups. "As players in Marcos' script of violence, they gradually broke free from the constraints of military discipline."
Class '90 confronted, in the post-People Power Revolt years, institutions shattered by the Marcos dictatorship. Their formation in PMA was a time of unprecedented ferment.
Some were teenagers when RAM first revolted. When Colonel Honasan attempted his bloodiest coup, Class '90 "preferred to support the Constitution." But its yearbook praised RAM's fight "for the Filipino people." They reecho in the Magdalo criticism of corruption.
"Contrast between Classes '40 and '71 offers insight of the country's past," McCoy writes. But "a comparison of Class '40 and '90 allows us a glimpse into the future." Five classes later, the sought-after peek into the future emerged in Oakwood.
Looking back, McCoy noted that while they were cadets, all of them staged protests: Class '40 over unfair exams; Class '71, staff corruption and Class '90, government hypocrisy.
Similarity can conceal difference. Class '40s strike reinforced their commitment to the chain of command," the book notes. "The abortive protest of '71 later inspired revolt against the same hierarchy."
"The meaning Class '90 draws from these experiences, and the way these lessons [are] challenged by their service as junior officers, will have a lasting influence on them and the armed forces," he asserts.
Recent comment, however, focused on how PMA Class '71 stacked up against Class '40. That's understandable. Graduates of '71 included the failed coup artist Honasan and former presidential candidate Panfilo Lacson.
Yet, Class '71s six coups flopped. "Majority of Filipino officers did not believe in seizing state power," McCoy noted. "A tentative belief in civil supremacy and military professionalism somehow survived the Marcos year." This mixed history impacted on the PMA classes of the '90s.
Oakwood collapsed in 24 hours. Erap's descamisados didn't rally to Magdalo's inverted flag and embroidered armbands. Neither did other military men.
President Manuel Quezon was always wary of the military in politics. He established a corps of professional officers. Thus, Quezon denied "control over the nation's arsenals to established political elites, whether nationalist lawyers from UP or corporate executives from Ateneo."
Marcos' uncorked the coup genie. "By his long service to the dictatorship, and his presidency, Ramos gave form to these fears," the book adds.
For now, President Macapagal-Arroyo must end coup-for-rent disruptions. Her hard-pressed administration needs breathing space.
"Long after a president's name is remembered only in fading street signs," the Yale book adds, "an entire cohort of officers will bear the imprint of his or her decisions-and influence the character of the Philippine military and nation," the book warns. That will affect the President's grandchildren too.
Updated 11:27pm (Mla time) Oct 04, 2004
By Juan Mercado
Inquirer News Service
Editor's Note: Published on page A12 of the October 5, 2004 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer
WILL President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo decisively close down one of this troubled country's newer businesses: "coups for rent"?
Courts are now hearing mutiny cases lodged against 32--out of the original 325 soldiers--who took over the Oakwood apartments, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales noted. The "Magdalo" rebels, thus, are beyond the President's reach, he said. And amnesty is Congress' prerogative.
Mixed signals earlier wafted from Malacanang on a "deal," following the public apology from Navy Lt. Antonio Trillanes VI and other mutineers.
In their mea culpa, the rebels--mostly Philippine Military Academy Class '95 graduates--insisted they were sincere reformers. Democracy then does not grow out of a gun barrel? They'd abide now by the Constitution, in the military, if given a chance.
"Hot money" sloshes in this town. No one, let alone deposed Joseph Estrada, picked up the mutiny tab, the Magdalos claimed. Their "idealism was not for hire."
Reactions were varied. Veteran of failed "God Save The Queen" coups, Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile, predictably thumbed-up amnesty. Finger your godfather first, a House defense committee member said. Someone bankrolled those polished boots, radios, airline tickets, plus brand-new vans later abandoned. "Who rented this coup?"
"Unless justice is done, this problem will reappear in the future," warned Dr. Carolina Hernandez, University of the Philippines scholar on the military. We've been there before, she recalled. Both the Davide and Feliciano Commissions insist on justice as basis for closure.
Amnesty chatter sent some to re-read "Closer Than Brothers-Manhood at the Philippine Military Academy" (Yale University 1999). This study compares three generations of PMA graduates: Classes '40, '71 and '90. Written by Prof. Alfred McCoy, it asks: Have constitutional values, in soldiers trained on taxpayers money, atrophied?
"In the Philippines, institutions often seem the sum of personal ties," McCoy notes. PMA graduates "translate broad ideological currents into institutional change in an impoverished country where 169 families monopolize power."
Battle and Japanese concentration camps bonded Class '40 graduates. "Their belief in civil supremacy would later withstand the pressures of higher command," the study adds. "They actively blocked coup attempts."
Martial law co-opted Class '71. It became the "mailed fist of the dictatorship." Among its 85 graduates, five tortured, six were murdered. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan and 14 others were neck-deep in coups. "As players in Marcos' script of violence, they gradually broke free from the constraints of military discipline."
Class '90 confronted, in the post-People Power Revolt years, institutions shattered by the Marcos dictatorship. Their formation in PMA was a time of unprecedented ferment.
Some were teenagers when RAM first revolted. When Colonel Honasan attempted his bloodiest coup, Class '90 "preferred to support the Constitution." But its yearbook praised RAM's fight "for the Filipino people." They reecho in the Magdalo criticism of corruption.
"Contrast between Classes '40 and '71 offers insight of the country's past," McCoy writes. But "a comparison of Class '40 and '90 allows us a glimpse into the future." Five classes later, the sought-after peek into the future emerged in Oakwood.
Looking back, McCoy noted that while they were cadets, all of them staged protests: Class '40 over unfair exams; Class '71, staff corruption and Class '90, government hypocrisy.
Similarity can conceal difference. Class '40s strike reinforced their commitment to the chain of command," the book notes. "The abortive protest of '71 later inspired revolt against the same hierarchy."
"The meaning Class '90 draws from these experiences, and the way these lessons [are] challenged by their service as junior officers, will have a lasting influence on them and the armed forces," he asserts.
Recent comment, however, focused on how PMA Class '71 stacked up against Class '40. That's understandable. Graduates of '71 included the failed coup artist Honasan and former presidential candidate Panfilo Lacson.
Yet, Class '71s six coups flopped. "Majority of Filipino officers did not believe in seizing state power," McCoy noted. "A tentative belief in civil supremacy and military professionalism somehow survived the Marcos year." This mixed history impacted on the PMA classes of the '90s.
Oakwood collapsed in 24 hours. Erap's descamisados didn't rally to Magdalo's inverted flag and embroidered armbands. Neither did other military men.
President Manuel Quezon was always wary of the military in politics. He established a corps of professional officers. Thus, Quezon denied "control over the nation's arsenals to established political elites, whether nationalist lawyers from UP or corporate executives from Ateneo."
Marcos' uncorked the coup genie. "By his long service to the dictatorship, and his presidency, Ramos gave form to these fears," the book adds.
For now, President Macapagal-Arroyo must end coup-for-rent disruptions. Her hard-pressed administration needs breathing space.
"Long after a president's name is remembered only in fading street signs," the Yale book adds, "an entire cohort of officers will bear the imprint of his or her decisions-and influence the character of the Philippine military and nation," the book warns. That will affect the President's grandchildren too.
posted by Dante at 11:27 PM
0 Comments:
Post a Comment
<< Home